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per
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A new comparative law review worthy of attention is the Bulletin of
the Institute of Comparative Law of the National University of Mexico.
The Institute, founded in 1940 and presently headed by Lic. Agustin
Garcia L6pez, has decided to make the results of its manifold activities
accessible to an extended audience. The Bulletin will serve that purpose.
Like other comparative law journals, the Bulletin is composed of doctrinal and bibliographical sections and sections entitled "Legislation" and
"Information." In "Legislation," the legislative movement abroad is reported under subject headings; important new laws are reproduced in
full. The bibliographical section offers book ieviews and summaries of
articles published in foreign law journals. Activities of other institutes
and societies operating in the field are reported under "Information."
Each of the first two issues, January-April and May-August, 1948,
contains three doctrinal articles by members of the Institute. In the first
issue, Dr. Alcal-Zamora y Castillo, director of the Law School's Seminar
on the Law of Procedure, offers a comparative dissertation, Communication by Mail, Telegraph, Telephone, and Radio in the Law of Procedure,
in which he criticizes the slow adaptation of process to the advances of technique. Dr. Rodriguez y Rodriguez, director of the Seminar on Mercantile and Banking Law, discusses Identification Requirements in the Case
of Checks Payable to a Specific Person under the various legal systems,
and especially in Mexican law. Lic. Barrera Graf contributes a comparative law study, Sales against Documents. The second issue contains Dr.
Rodriguez' report, The Legal and Fiscal Status of Foreign Corporations
in Mexico, written for the Institute on French and Latin American Law
held in Paris in April, 1948. The discussion of the provisions on foreign
corporations in the 1947 draft for a new Commercial Code merits special
attention. Dr. Alcalf-Zamora writes on the 1946 Vatican City Code of
Civil Procedure and on the Swiss law of 1947 on Federal Civil Procedure,
comparing them with other recent codes and drafts. Lic. Aguilar
Gutierrez offers a comparative law study, The Promise to Pass a Contract, with special consideration of the variations which exist under the
Civil Code of 1928 for the Federal District and the codes of the various
Mexican states.
The legislative survey in both issues extends to most Latin American countries and also to Belgium, France, Italy, and Switzerland. Several
new laws are reprinted in full. The bibliography includes reviews of
books from Latin America, the United States, and France; summaries are
offered of law review articles and notes published in the United States.
The Mexican Institute is to be congratulated upon its new venture,
the quality of which is guaranteed by its members, prominent Mexican
jurists and well-known Spanish scholars residing in Mexico. The Mexi(577)
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can report on Comparative Law for the second conference of UNESCO,
held in Mexico in 1947, reproduced in the Bulletin's first issue, says:
" . a country which, like Mexico, is at the cross-roads of the two
great legal systems, the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon, is particularly well
placed for a comparison of both juridical cultures. With its neighbors to
the North it maintains a traffic of such an intensity that, every day, and
in all lines of operations and transactions, it is bound to feel stronger the
influence of its vast commercial experience; toward the South, regarding the whole of the American Continent, as well as in its relations with
the other Continent, Mexico maintains the basic concepts of Latin jurisprudence which are in accordance with its own tradition. Work on a
synthesis of both conceptions should be the task for the Mexican school
of jurisprudence."
Dissemination, through the Bulletin, of information
on important developments in Latin American law will be of value, for
it fulfils an urgent need. The lack of a journal where such information
is collected has put a heavy burden on the individual research worker
interested in Latin American law.
The appearance of the Mexican Comparative Law Bulletin and of
similar undertakings elsewhere cannot but remind the legal profession
here of the lack of an equivalent in the English language. The increased
interest in this country in foreign and comparative law, as a consequence
of the extended international responsibilities of the United States, makes
information for the American lawyer on foreign law developments, written
in his own idiom and prepared for his own needs, a necessity. The combined effort of the leading law schools should enable them to surmount
the technical and financial problems involved in such a venture.
The new French periodical on Latin American law is published under
the auspices of the Institute of Comparative Law of the University of
Paris and the French Society of Comparative Legislation. It is designed
to furnish information on the legislative movement and legal publications
in Latin America. The direction is in the hands of Dr. F. de Sola
Canizares, Spanish lawyer connected with the Paris Comparative Law
Institute.
Each issue contains a series of short articles by Latin American
authors, generally on domestic law topics, information by local lawyers
on their domestic legislation and literary production, sketches of prominent
Latin American jurists, notes on leading law journals, reports about institutes and conferences, and translations of statutes of special significance.
Inter-hemisphere activities, such as the conferences of the Inter-American
Bar Association and the sessions of the Inter-American Academy of Comparative and International Law, are covered.
The publication has a sound organic basis. The editor, who has
widely travelled in this hemisphere, has succeeded in securing from each
country the collaboration of prominent lawyers with experience in comparative law work. Thus the local reports are, with a few exceptions,
written to suit foreign readers and the doctrinal articles are on topics of
general interest even though they treat local law problems. The quantity
as well as the quality of the work is impressive. The publication is an
indispensible tool for specialists in Latin-American law.
Technically, the publication needs improvement, especially in the
grouping of the materials. An important article in the second issue, for
example, State Intervention in Private Rights in Argentina, risks being
overlooked in a section headed "Legal and Bibliographical Sources." In-
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ter-hemisphere activities are not reported under this heading, but under the
name of the country in which the event took place. Use of the information on legislation and literature is made difficult by the absence of a
subject index.
It may also be worth considering whether or not legislative and other
materials from Puerto Rico should be included. Similarly, it would add
to completeness if Latin American law studies originating in this country
were listed. A beginning has been made already in calling attention to
the excellent Guides to Latin American Law and Literature published by
the Library of Congress.
Not the least interesting feature of the new enterprise is that it originates in a country of the old world. France has lately taken an increased
interest in legal developments in Latin America, as evidenced by frequent
visits of prominent jurists and the organization of Franco-Latin American
legal conferences. The traditional interest in France in comparative law
and a desire to react against decreasing French influence in Latin America
seem to have been moving factors, in addition to the availability in Paris
of a lawyer highly qualified for the task. Lawyers with reading knowledge
of French will express gratification that French institutions have succeeded
in producing an excellent Latin American law journal.
Kurt H. Nadelmannt

MANAGEMENT-UNION

By Maxwell Copelof. Harper and
Pp. 359, $5.00.

AimITRATION.

Brothers, New York, 1948.

Here is a book which should be read by all students and practitioners
of the law who expect to take part in labor arbitration. That should be
a large group, because lalbor arbitration is becoming an important field for
the legal profession. Lawyers are being called upon increasingly not only
to advise management and unions with respect to labor arbitration matters
but also to present cases before arbitrators and to serve as arbitrators.
The American Arbitration Association reports that in labor arbitration
cases held under its rules lawyers represented clients in eighty-four per
cent of the cases in 1942 and in ninety-six per cent of the cases in 1947.
Maxwell Copelof is not a lawyer but he has been an arbitrator for
more than twenty years. During that period he has served successfully
in hundreds of labor disputes. From this rich experience he has drawn
together in this book his most important cases and has presented them with
enlightening comment in a very interesting manner. He has organized
the cases into nine categories with the following important titles: (1) cases
involving direction of the working force, (2) union rights and prerogatives,
(3) discharge and other disciplinary cases, (4) wage disputes arising out
of contract, (5) incentive pay disputes arising under contract, (6) contract clauses on "fringe issues," (7) disputes not controlled by contract
clauses, (8) arbitrating new contract provisions, and (9) when to mediate.
In each category the cases are well chosen to illustrate the major issues
which arise in the particular area under discussion.
In each case the general nature and background of the dispute is
presented first in a few sentences or several paragraphs depending on
'IVisiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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their complexity. Then the pertinent clauses of the labor agreement are
quoted, followed by the arguments of the parties. The decision and the
comments of Mr. Copelof are reserved until the end. This method of
presentation makes it possible for the reader, by evaluating the facts and
arguments, presented in each case and arriving at his own decision before
reading Copelof's, to check his ability as an arbitrator against that of one
who has been very successful in the field. This reviewer found it an exciting game.
It is to be expected that arbitrators, just as judges, will disagree at
times. The reviewer disagrees with Copelof's decisions with respect to
retroactivity in cases involving management's right of administrative initiative. The right of administrative initiative is the right to make immediate decisions. Copelof argues, and rightly so, that this right should
be retained by management in contracts where arbitration is the terminal
point of the grievance procedure and that the workers should have the
right to appeal management's decisions only after they have been put into
effect.
Peremptory and dictative orders do not usually bring the necessary response and the best results. Workers, nevertheless, must in
the first instance obey orders given and if these orders cause or create
any unfair working conditions, proceed through the union in an
orderly way to bring about the correction of any just grievance.
It has always been the contention of the reviewer, however, that the right
of administrative initiative carries with it the responsibility to make full
retroactive adjustment when management makes an error in its original
decision. Unless this latter principle is followed the workers and the
union might find it to their advantage to challenge management's right
of administrative initiative. In view of this, exception is taken to the following decision and others like it where full retroactive adjustment was
denied by Copelof.
The request of the union that Mr. S. be compensated for the
loss of earnings during the period after he was rejected for this job
was denied by the arbitrator. The reason was that the company had
acted with obvious sincerity in assigning the job to another operator
who the management, albeit erroneously, thought was entitled to the
job.
Most of Copelof's decisions, however, appear to be very reasonable. That
they have been considered fair by management and labor is evident. Otherwise he would not have been able to continue as a successful arbitrator
over the years.
Copelof does not undertake a thorough analysis of the legal status
of labor arbitration. Less than two pages are devoted to this subject. No
attempt is made to interpret, compare, and evaluate the varying common
and statutory laws in effect in the states or the contradictory decisions
which have been rendered by the federal courts on the applicability of the
United States Arbitration Act to labor disputes. This is not intended as
a criticism of the book but rather as fair warning to anyone who may be
searching for an analysis of the law on the subject.
Lawyers will find within this book, however, much food for thought
on certain basic legal concepts. For example, what is the nature of the
collective bargaining contract? Is it such that management "has the
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right to change a policy or practice in the absence of a contract clause
limiting its right" or is it such that "the company is bound by past practice and cannot change the terms of employment or working conditions
on a unilateral basis ?" In other words, does the theory of residual rights,
whereby it is contended that management retains all those rights which it
has not bargained away specifically, apply to the collective bargaining agreement? Copelof has had to tackle this and a number of other basic legal
issues in fhe decisions which he has rendered.
Perhaps the greatest value of the book to lawyers, however, is the
opportunity it provides to become familiar with the procedures, techniques,
and principles of the so-called "non-legalistic" school of arbitrators.
Copelof is definitely of this school. His chapter entitled "Preparation and
Presentation of Cases" will prove worthwhile reading to lawyers who are
not well informed with respect to the differences between courtroom procedures and arbitration hearing procedures as practiced by this school of
arbitrators. The chapter is an excellent guide to anyone whose job it may
be to prepare, present, or hear an ad hoc labor arbitration case.
The "legalistic school" of arbitrators will take issue with Copelof on
a number of points. They will disagree with his contention that arbitrators should mediate under certain conditions. In his final chapter, entitled "When to Mediate," Copelof compares mediation by an arbitrator
with mediation by a judge and concludes:
Perhaps the judge himself gets the attorneys together in a private
session and suggests the desirability of a compromise settlement.
There is nothing out of order in such tactics, either in strictly legal
proceedings or in arbitration proceedings.
Of course, mediation efforts have to be handled by tact and
finesse on the part of all concerned. The arbitrator himself may call
a recess and ask the chief spokesmen if they want to try to work out
a compromise. If either side objects, it is his duty to proceed with the
hearing, and render his decision. If both sides are willing to try to
settle the matter, the arbitrator will refrain from participating in any
discussion concerning a compromise. He will encourage the parties
to endeavor to reach an accord, if possible, but will stay out of such
discussions himself, so as not to be put in a position of suggesting a
compromise. Or, if they so request, he may sound them out on the
acceptability of a compromise solution which he himself suggests. If,
however, his solution is unacceptable to either side, it then becomes
his duty to resume the hearings and decide the case entirely on the
basis of the terms of the submission and the preponderance of the
evidence submitted to him.
The successful examples of mediation presented in this chapter lend strong
support to Cdpelof's position and testify to his skill as a mediator.
There will also be objection to Copelof's practice of making recommendations and offering advice to the parties in addition to the formal
decision. Consider for example the case in which, after ruling that the
company was within its rights under the contract in refusing to rehire
a worker, he proceeded to recommend that
the company's interests would best be served, in the long run, if it
voluntarily took action in this by giving Mrs. M. an opportunity to
work at the plant when an opening was available, and thus put at an
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end any possible misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the company's attitude, which the arbitrator is convinced is a genuinely wholesome one.
Thus Copelof has written a book about which there will be considerable controversy. It is, in fact, impossible to deal with the important
issues in labor arbitration today without running into competing schools
of thought. Copelof's book is a good book because it does deal effectively
with many of these important controversial issues. It deserves careful
reading, therefore, by management, labor, lawyers, and arbitrators.

Thomas Kennedy t

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Arthur N. Holcombe.
New York University Press, New York, 1948. Pp. viii, 162, $3.75.
At the San Francisco organizing meeting for the United Nations in
1945, President Truman stated that he hoped for an international bill
of rights "as much a part of international life as our own Bill of Rights
is a part of our Constitution." In 1946 the Economic and Social Council
set up an eighteen-nation Commission on Human Rights with Mrs.
Roosevelt as chairman to draft the bill.' A revised declaration of rights2
was completed in the summer of 1948 and sent to the General Assembly,
which approved it on December 10, 1948, by a 48 to 0 vote, with abstentions by Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the Soviet bloc of six votes;
Honduras and Yemen were recorded as absent. Mr. Vishinsky of Soviet
Russia attacked the declaration on the grounds that the provision for
freedom of expression permitted expressions of hatred, fascism and war;
that it failed to specify that a state had a concrete obligation to insure
labor's right to social security; that it failed to provide protection for
national minorities; and that it failed to refer to the sovereign rights of
states.
This Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the first part of a
projected three part International Bill of Rights. The second part will
3
be a convention called a covenant embodying in specific detail and in
legally binding form the principles set forth in the Declaration. The third
part will be a protocol for implementation of the convention, possibly by
such measures as the creation of an International Court of Human Rights
and an International Commission of Conciliation.
It is of interest that the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association on September 7, 1948, adopted a resolution opposing approval
of the Draft Declaration of Human Rights and the Draft Covenant of
t Assistant Professor of Industrial Relations, Wharton School of Finance and
Commerce, University of Pennsylvania.
1. The names of the members of the Commission are set out in 34 A. B. A. J.984
(1948).
2. For the first draft, that of December 17, 1947, see 34 A. B. A. J. 204 (1948).
For the second draft, that of June 18, 1948, see 34 A. B. A. J. 910 (1948). For the
official views of the United States Government on the first draft, see 34 A. B. A. J.
476 (1948). For the adopted draft, see 34 A. B. A. J.32 (1949).
3. For the Draft International Covenant of Human Rights of December 17, 1947,
see 34 A. B. A. J.202 (1948), and for the official views of the United States Government on this draft, see 34 A. B. A. J.476 (1948).
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Human Rights, asking deferment of consideration by the General Assembly of the United Nations until its regular 1949 session, favoring submission of the Declaration to Congress before its adoption, and authorizing
the American Bar Association to study the drafts in cooperation with the
Canadian Bar Association. 4 President Frank E. Holman of the American Bar Association has recently criticized the proposals on many
grounds: 5 that Mrs. Roosevelt, Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights, is not a lawyer, nor are the other two Anglo-American members
of the eighteen-member commission; that the proposals are at variance with
our fundamental concepts of individual rights and freedoms; that they
would impose world-wide socialism on the United States and other nations; 6 that they fail to stress the right of owning private property 7 and
of conducting business under a free enterprise system; that they will not
contribute to world peace; 8 that they will result in continual and minute
interference in the internal affairs of member states; that other than American standards of human rights will be applied; that the proposed Covenant
imposes affirmative economic and social duties upon each state, whereas
the American Bill of Rights is couched in the negative; 9 that the proposals
fail to provide for free participation in government; 10 that the proposed
Covenant presupposes the establishment of an International Court of
Human Relations; 11 and that the proposals involve supernational supervision of the relationship of a state to its own citizens.
4. Declaration on Human Rights: Canadian, American. Bars Ask Delay of
Action, 34 A. B. A. J. 881, 883 (1948). The Lord Chancellor of England announced
in the House of Lords on May 7, 1948, that he did not favor the submission of the
drafts to the 1948 session. The Government of Canada took the same view. 34 A. B.
A. J. 480 (1948). The position of the United States Government is set out in 34
A. B. A. J. 476-478 (1948).
5. Holman, An International Bill of Rights: ProposalsHave Dangerous Implications for U. S., 34 A. B. A. J. 984 (1948). Dissatisfaction with the final draft is
indicated in 34 A. B. A. J. 1091, 1122-1123 (1948) ; 35 A. B. A. J. 40 (1949).
6. Yet the statement of ESSENTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS, published by the American
Law Institute in January, 1946, and the Draft International Bill of Human Rights,
prepared by the American Association for the United Nations in 1946, both contained
articles setting forth a right to education, a right to work, and a right to social
security. See pp. 16-17 of the volume here reviewed.
7. Article 17 of the Universal Declaration was adopted on December 10, 1948,
providing, however:
"1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others.
"2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
Professor Lauterpacht included no provision as to property, though the American
Law Institute did in its ESSENTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 243 ANNALS 18 (1946). He
explained his omission by asserting that the "character. of sanctity and inviolability has
now departed from the right of property." LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 163 (1945).
8. But compare, statement in Book Review, 9 CAMB. L. 3. 261 (1946): "The
Second World War came about because the greater part of mankind took up arms
against an enemy not only of all decent government but of the elementary rights of
human beings." See also p. 1 of the volume reviewed.
9. But the commentary of the American Law Institute's ESSENTIAL HUMAN
RIGHTS points out that all of the rights require not only abstention but also, in varying
degrees, preventive, protective and administrative activity by government, 243 ANNALS
18 (1946).
10. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration as adopted in December 10, 1948,
provides, however, that everyone "has the right to take part in the Government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives."
11. In February, 1948, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
voted against the creation of a new and separate International Court of Human
Rights. 34 A. B. A. 3. 277, 278 (1948).
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The present volume is the third in English to appear on human rights
and the United Nations. The first was by Professor Hersh Lauterpacht
of Cambridge University in 1945 12 and the second by Jacob Robinson in
1946.13 The present volume consists of six lectures delivered under the
auspices of the James Stokes Lectureships on Politics at New York University in March and April of 1948 together with an epilogue on freedom
of information. The author is Eaton Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard University. The book is so timely and so extremely well
written as to warrant a synopsis of its contents.
In the first lecture the author points out that once in the Preamble
and six times in the body of the Charter of the United Nations the
framers expressed their faith in human rights. The promotion of human
rights was one of the primary concerns of the framers of the Charter. The
original source of the policies leading to the provisions in the Charter
was President Roosevelt's message to Congress on January 6, 1941, concerning the Four Freedoms-freedom of speech and expression, freedom
of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. The Atlantic
Charter of August, 1941, re-affirmed the last two of these freedoms.
The author believes that the United Nations will have a harder task
than Congress in framing a bill of rights for three reasons: (1) the interests of the members of the United Nations are more diverse than those
within the United States; (2) the variety of opinion on such matters as
capitalism, religion, etc., is even more striking than the variety of interests within the United States; and (3) the different attitudes of the
five major powers towards bills of rights in their own systems of government. To translate the idea of a bill of rights into a working rule of law
will encounter difficulties of three kinds: (1) the difficulty of agreeing on
the content of such a bill; (2) the difficulty of enforcement; and (3) the
difficulty of reconciling the obligations of memberships in a particular
political community with the requirements of a universal system of human
rights.
The second lecture is devoted to the American Bill of Rights, and in
the third lecture, it is pointed out that there is a wide gap between the
privileges and immunities of citizens, as set forth in state papers, and the
actual participation in their enjoyment by various classes of people in the
United States. Public opinion polls in 1945 indicated that only 43 per
cent favored state laws requiring employers to hire persons qualified for
the job regardless of race or color. In 1946 only 64 per cent agreed that
in peacetime newspapers should be allowed to criticize our form of government; and only about 21 per cent knew what our Bill of Rights was. The
United States Supreme Court as recently as 1947 14 restricted the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship to a narrow list of civil
rights, relating to specific relations with the federal government, such as
the right to travel to the national capital. But the author concludes that
the Supreme Court has been more successful in enforcing the constitutional provisions as to bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, the obligation
of contracts, procedural limitations on governmental power, and due process of law. On the whole, the Supreme Court has made great advances
in recent years in the protection of constitutional rights of individuals, both
12.

LAUTERPACHT, op.

cit. supra note 7 at 230.

13.

ROBINSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 166 (1946).

14. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947).
(1948).

FREEDOMS IN THE CHARTER

Cf. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257
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as to acts of Congress and acts of the state governments. But judicial
protection is limited in what it can accomplish. Judges can act only on
cases brought before them. Local authorities may fail to cooperate with
national officers. The debates over the anti-lynching, anti-poll-tax, and
fair employment practices bills are illustrative of the complexity of the
problem. The state judges are still primarily responsible for the protection of the rights of their citizens, and they often reflect the preponderant
opinion among the people in their state rather than the best thinking of the
whole body of people. As the author states: "The need for a popular civilrights campaign in America more than a century and a half after the
adoption of the revolutionary declarations and bills of rights is a sobering
fact which may well be borne in mind by those who are planning an international bill of rights for the nations of the world." 15
The fourth lecture is entitled "The Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens of the United Nations." The author concludes that the American
experience suggests that there is a wide difference between the rights of
the peoples of particular nations in their own countries and the privileges
and immunitfes of members of the whole body of peoples comprising the
United Nations. The American experience indicates that human rights
under the United Nations Charter will depend mainly upon the different
attitudes of the various peoples within the member states. The American
experience also indicates a fundamental ambiguity in the idea of human
rights: are they those rights which all groups have in common and respect
and observe alike-a realistic view; or are they a body of political, economic, and social ideals-an idealistic view? The United Nations has
no such machinery as exists in the United States for the settlement of
disputes concerning basic human rights, even though our machinery may
move slowly at times. Its status resembles more closely that of the American union under the Articles of Confederation. The nations of the world
are seriously divided as to the content of their national bills of rights. The
bills of rights of the United States and the state constitutions do not
tnention a right to work or a right to full employment. Article 118 of the
Russian constitution provides that Russian citizens "have the right to
guaranteed employment and payment for their work in accordance with its
quantity and quality." The preamble of the present French constitution
proclaims that everyone has the duty to work and the right to obtain employment and there are guarantees of rest and leisure as well as protection against the hazards of age, sickness, and involuntary unemployment.
In Great Britain there is no formal declaration of a right to work. The
American bill of rights does not expressly mention freedom of business
enterprise, but such a freedom was read into the Federal Bill of Rights by
the old Supreme Court and the present court insists on freedom of contract. The Russian constitution provides for the right to education but
gives no freedom for religious education. The new French constitution in
its preamble confers a right to education, but seems to give no freedom
for religious education. The English have not regarded the right to education as a fundamental freedom. The Federal Bill of Rights says nothing
about a right to education, but the state constitutions encourage public
education. Although all the great powers have provisions as to freedom
of speech and press, their concepts are vastly different from the Russian
concept. The author concludes that the most controversial articles of the
proposed Declaration of Rights of the Commission on Human Rights are
those concerning the right to work and the right to own private property.
15. P. 72.
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The provision as to the right to education throws no light on the right of
religious bodies to establish private school systems. A serious gap in the
declaration is the failure to touch upon the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United Nations, regarded as members of a single body of
people. The author would withhold judgment on the work of the Commission on Human Rights pending examination of its proposed Covenant.
The fifth lecture deals with the problem of enforcement. It is a fair
inference from the language of the Charter that the immunity of member
states against interference in their domestic affairs does not authorize them
to disregard their obligations to respect the basic human rights of their
subjects. But it is a great defect of the Charter that there is no adequate
process for enforcing its purposes upon individuals. The Human Rights
Commission proposes to overcome the difficulties of enforcement by submitting the Covenant for ratification by the member nations. The proposed Covenant is shorter than the declaration and contains specific limitations upon governmental power, both substantive and procedural. The
author concludes that it "reflects the dominant influence of Anglo-American legal concepts." 16 The Covenant could readily be enforced in nations
possessing systems of law enforcement like our own. But unhappily there
are few countries in which judges can play so important a part in the
protection of human rights as in the United States. Russian judges have
no security of tenure, being elected by the Supreme and local soviets for
terms of only three or five years. American experience indicates that
progress toward uniform and high standards will be slow in many nations,
unless these rights are brought directly under the protection of international courts of justice set up by the United Nations. The author suggests that there are three ways of enforcing a declaration of human
rights: (1) public opinion, (2) an international high commission, 17 and
(3) the adoption of a bill of rights dealing with that part of the general
field of human rights concerned with the relations between persons in
different countries and between such persons and the general international
organization itself.
The sixth and final lecture is entitled "Human Rights and the Rights
of Nations under the Charter." The author concludes that the United
Nations has proceeded promptly and persistently to promote respect for
human rights. But he points out that the obstacles to ungrudging agreement upon the contents of a bill of rights and to its successful enforcement
are formidable. The sovereignty of the national states will make difficult
a redefinition of the relationship of the society in which the individual lives.
Americans would resent having an international agency settle the problems raised by discrimination against Negroes and by the activities of such
groups as Jehovah's Witnesses. The declaration of human rights should
not go beyond giving fresh sanction and wider authority to the original
Four Freedoms of President Roosevelt. The world is not ready to add
anything like the Fourteenth Amendment to the Charter of the United
Nations. The Bill of Rights ought to deal with that part of human rights
that is concerned with the relations between persons in different nations
and between such persons and the general international organization itself. The author agrees with Roger N. Baldwin that it should cover
freedom of international communication by radio, cable, news films, and
16. P. 107.
17. The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in February, 1948,
adopted a resolution opposing creation of an international agency. 34 A. B. A. J.
277, 278 (1948).
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travel, the right of aliens coming before national courts to suitable protection, and the right of peoples to have the recognition of governments
and states determined upon sound general principles. There can be no
agreement between the Western democracies and Soviet Russia on a bill
of rights defining the relation of the individual to his own particular state.
The author has good precedent for warning about caution in expansive definitions of human rights. As Jessup states: "The human rights
to be defined and protected must be considered not in a vacuum of theory,
but in terms of the constitutions and laws and practices of more than
Throughout its work the Commission
seventy states of the world. . .
on Human Rights will be tossed from substantive problems to the procedures for their enforcement. It would do well to avoid seeking to impose as universal concepts those which are historically local phenomena.
*
. * The philosopher may aid in drafting the Declaration; the practical
statesman will have to devise the procedures." 18
The difficulties with respect to an International Bill of Rights may
well lead one to accept the correctness of Professor Freeman's statement:
"Some, like Justice Owen Roberts, with much logic insist that these rights
cannot be achieved until an international government operates on and in
favor of individuals." 19
Lester B. Orfield t

THE SOCIAL POLITICS OF FEPC. By Louis Coleridge Kesselman. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1948. Pp. xii, 270,

$3.50.
The Social Politics of FEPC is not a study of the reason or wisdom
of legislation to prevent racial and religious discrimination in employment.
It might better be entitled "How a Pressure Group Works," because the
book really undertakes only to discuss the methods utilized to compel a
reluctant Congress to enact a federal anti-discrimination law.
The author will dissappoint and annoy a great many persons who may
pick up the book with the expectation of being informed as to why a
federal "fair employment practice commission" should or should not be
established. They will find that not one of the burning issues involved
receives any attention. Have minorities a "civil right" to force other
minorities, or majorities, to associate with them? Does freedom of association include freedom not to associate? Can private business survive
the exercise by government of the power to control the employer's selection and retention of employees? Even if state legislatures have authority,
under the police power, to enact a state FEPC law (which is doubtful),
where, in the Constitution, was the Congress granted any power to enact
such a federal law?
Perhaps it is well that Dr. Kesselman left these issues to persons
who have given them serious attention. He simply assumes that a demand for anti-discrimination laws is a "humanitarian" movement. The
idea that discrimination in the choice of one's associates may be one of the
NATIoNs 92-93
18. JEssup, A MoDERN LAW O1F
19. Book Review, 15 FoRD. L. REv. 309 (1946).

(1948).

t Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law.
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most valuable and virtuous qualities apparently never occurs to him. The
idea that racial instincts, religious distinctions, and personal likes and dislikes are respectable and should be respected, and are not absolutely good
or bad, gets no consideration. The profound importance of state's rights,
local self-government and constitutional limitations on both state and
federal powers exerts no influence on his thought.
As a result the author presents with complacence, indeed with approval, a shocking picture of government by minority pressures. On the
assumption that the cause of anti-discrimination is noble, on the assumption
that Congress ought to pass a law (which it has actually been denied the
power to pass), Dr. Kesselman can extol pressure group actions which he
would denounce as outrageous if taken to achieve what he regarded as
an evil result.
For example, FEPC was born in 1941 because a "hard boiled pressure group" threatened the President to disrupt national defense, to injure
domestic unity and to disturb international relations by starting a class
war with a gigantic "March on Washington" of Negroes to demonstrate
against "discrimination." In this emergency a reluctant President issued
an executive order, dictated in large part by those who were willing to take
advantage of a time of national danger to advance their special interests.
All through the ensuing World War II the FEPC lobbies made strategic
gains, just as the Prohibition lobby operated in World War I. In both
cases it was claimed that sumptuary, paternalistic legislation would make
people better and help win the war. In both cases government power
was used to enforce the moralities of zealous, intolerant reformers. In
both cases success was obtained by methods which are universally criticised
when employed by less self-righteous lobbyists.
Dr. Kesselman reports all the ways and means adopted to coerce
members of Congress to support legislation for which they had no enthusiasm. But never once does he answer the question: Why were so
many congressmen opposed to such "humanitarian" law making? He does
devote a brief chapter to "The Opposition," but makes it clear that there
was little well organized opposition. Indeed he reports that "the demands
of the war effort were too great to permit opponents to exert their maximum energies against FEPC." In other words, the people who gave all
their energies to the war had not the time or the will to resist the insistent pressures of those who seemed to be more interested in their "moral
crusade" than in the life or death struggle of the nation to survive.
So, all through the war the FEPC pressure groups, as reported approvingly in this book, continued to harass the President and all government agencies and departments with demands for a more militant, more
troublesome FEPC. They "coerced the government" into a new executive order, issued May 27, 1943, establishing a more powerful committee
and, "for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, the Committee's expenditures jumped to $431,609."
An interesting example of the practical way to carry on a "moral
crusade" is given in connection with the campaign for a permanent FEPC.
Representative Norton (Chairman of the House Labor Committee) was
going to introduce her own FEPC bill which didn't entirely please the
FEPC lobby. So several Negro leaders in New Jersey telegraphed "Boss"
Hague of Jersey City (never regarded as an outstanding supporter of
"civil liberties!") demanding support of the lobby bill by Mrs. Norton.
Hague telegraphed the next day that Mrs. Norton had agreed to introduce and support their bill. Of course, if this had been a bill supported
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by "big business," Mayor Hague's influence upon a representative would
have been regarded as sinister; but in a "humanitarian" cause it was much
esteemed. 0
The most enlightening part of Dr. Kesselman's book is his documentation of the methods whereby one comparatively small organization of
Negroes (the Sleeping Car Porters), under clever and forceful leadership, was able to enlist the aid of a large number of religious organizations
in advancing legislation which would ultimately do an infinite amount of
harm to all concerned. The writer of this review knows from an extensive personal experience with this and similar movements that very
few, if any, of the religious organizations which have given aid and comfort to the FEPC lobby ever made any careful study of the effects or
legality of the proposed legislation. It has been a common assumption
that discrimination is evil and that it can be and ought to be remedied
by law.
Even the fact that the earliest and most zealous supporter of FEPC
was the Communist party did not arouse much antagonism. It was
pointed out that Communists support many worthy reforms and the FEPC
lobby was wise enough to discourage close Communist collaboration. (Apparently Dr. Kesselman thinks that this policy was unwise!)
There are now available several careful analyses of FEPC legislation
and its effect; and one wonders why Dr. Kesselman stopped his story in
1946, when the present opposition to FEPC was just beginning to rise
and when, with the end of the war, people generally had a chance to study
domestic political problems again. However, by avoiding all reference to
recent congressional committee hearings and other sources of information,
the author is enabled to conclude his book with a few sweeping and misleading assertions, two of which are worth quoting:
"In the states having laws with 'teeth' the record has been good."
"The fact that no decision from any state commission had been appealed to the courts at the time of writing is a tribute to their skill in
negotiating satisfactory adjustments of complaints at the conference level."
(Or is it a tribute to their wisdom in avoiding a court test of a bad law?)
It is notorious that the "success" of state laws has been achieved
largely by non-enforcement; and has been possible because there has been,
ever since the war, an unprecedented volume of employment. The attempt to enforce one of these laws, or a compulsory federal law, in a time
of unemployment would open a Pandora's box of litigation and law evasion
comparable to the products of laws designed to enforce national prohibition.
Dr. Kesselman's book will not enlighten people much about the
merits of FEPC legislation. But, he has performed a service in explaining how it is possible for a small number of professional lobbyists to use
large organizations of well meaning, misinformed persons to support legislation contrary to their own interests and injurious to the general welfare.
Donald R. Richberg t
t Member of the Illinois Bar; General Counsel, National Recovery Administration, 1933-1935; Executive Director, National Emergency Council, 1934-1935; Chairman, National Recovery Administration Board, 1935; Special Assistant to the United
States Attorney General, 1935, 1936.
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The outstanding characteristics of this study of the campaign for a
Federal FEPC are its frankness and lack of pretense. Dr. ,Kesselman
traces the growth, struggles and maneuvers of the National Council for
a Permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission with the objectivity
of a military tactician reconstructing a battle to determine why an
army failed to take a given objective; the considerations are logistic precision, resources, personnel, strength of opposition and timing. The justice
of the cause 1 is incidental and divorced. Although sympathetic to the
FtPC principle, the author rarely allows himself the liberty of undocumented conclusion and there is no attempt to "sell" or romanticize FEPC.
For those who are interested in the merits of the FEPC case an exhaustive.
well-organized bibliography of literature and documents is provided.2
The author does not argue or assume the nobility of non-discrimination. Nor does he presume to deny the thesis, entertained by some
critics of the FEPC idea, that discrimination on the basis of creed or origin
may be a most valuable and virtuous quality. He does not attempt to
convince those who still hold that bigotry which results in the denial of employment opportunities and in consequent societal distortions is respectable and should be respected. Indeed, how could he? Instead, Dr.
Kesselman presents the moral judgments of church groups and the means
by which belief in religious principles has been vitalized. Carefully and
expertly sketched are the contributions of each religious group to the
campaign for FEPC.3 Particularly enlightening is the story of the participation of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, representing twenty-five of the principal Protestant denominations. The concern of the leaders of the "majority" church with economic discrimination against minorities is described as wholehearted and deep-rooted.4 The
forthright assistance of Protestantism, the effective program of the
Society of Friends, 5 the active aid of the Catholic church 6 and the endorsement by Jewish religious groups 7 are not cited by the author as
proof that the FEPC concept is consistent with national morality; but
for those who still doubt the moral soundness of FEPC the combined
judgment of the nation's religions should be persuasive.
The methods employed in the persuasion of congressmen by reform
groups and by selfish interests are "facts of life" which Dr. Kesselman
makes no attempt to conceal or embroider. His bluntness may surprise
those who assume that democratic progress should spring full-grown out
of a never-never atmosphere from which money-raising, high-pressure
1. The merits of FEPC are referred to parenthetically at the close of the work in
a two-page summary of the progress which has been made in increasing employment
opportunity for Negroes since President Roosevelt created the Committee on Fair Employment Practices.
2. The bibliography is divided into "Books," "Periodical Articles," "U. S. Government Releases, Reports, Monographs, etc.," "News Letters, Organizational Periodicals, etc.," "Reports, Manuals and Special Studies,"r and "Encyclopedia Articles."
It is especially rich in writings dealing with historical background of minority group
problems in employment, the morality of FEPC and the legal and constitutional implications of state and federal statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment.
3. P. 127 et seq.
4. P. 128.

5. P. 136.
6. P. 139, citing Encyclical of Pope Pius XII, SzERrum LA-rrzAz.
7. P. 165.
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lobbying and political "bossism" have been completely filtered. He neither
condemns nor esteems the gestative incidents of practical legislative
politics; he merely reports the pressures and the influences as he sees
them. Thus in outlining the use made of "Boss" Hague to secure Representative Norton's support for the National Councils' bill, the author appends a luminous reference to the functioning of the "invisible" rulers of our
democratic destiny and the power of party-bossism for good and evil.8
Similar objective treatment is accorded the bitter political antagonism
which prevented the National Council from collaborating with communist
and near-communist supporters of fair employment legislation. Here too,
Dr. Kesselman neither denounces nor applauds the refusal of the National
Council to make common cause with the extreme leftists. His concern is
with appraising the practical drawback of the communist, taint,9 and the
drain of the intense ideological warfare upon the energies and resources
of the FEPC movement.' °
The Social Politics of FEPC,which bears the publication date, 1948,
takes us up to the report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights in
November of 1947."- This volume documents the answers to the prophets of doom by citing state FEPC statutes and city ordinances which
were enacted after national experience with a temporary FEPC. 12 The
volume may have gone to press before the Democratic, Republican and
Progressive parties included a permanent FEPC plank in each of their
respective platforms. Too recent for inclusion were the pro-FEPC campaign speeches of Presidential Candidates Truman and Dewey, and the
election results which are, at least, some indication of the electorate's approval of Mr. Truman's clear-cut stand on civil rights. Dr. Kesselman
does not labor the distinction between the crusade for the prohibition
8. P. 221. "54. 'Few organized groups are so ignorant of practical politics as to
fail to appreciate the role and influence of that "invisible" yet all too visible agency of
government: the American political boss. Exceptional indeed is the pressure group
which would hesitate to approach the political leaders responsible for the nomination
and election of the men and women who sit in our State Legislature. This has been
universally recognized as one of the most practical and realistic ways of obtaining results. The "boss" in American politics is thus widely courted by individuals and groups
with the noblest, as well as the most ignoble, purposes. . . . Belle Zeller, op. cit.,
p. 238.'"
9. "One of the charges which the Council had to fight constantly was that it was
a communist organization. Had the Council cooperated closely with the left-wingers
it would have appeared to vindicate this viewpoint and would have discouraged many
potential supporters from joining hands with the Randolph group."

P. 163.

10. "The conflict with the communists and their sympathizers is a familiar story
in liberal movements. Those who are not acquainted with the details of the ideological
battle may see little reason for the intense antagonism among groups which can
agree on so many immediate reforms which they would like accomplished. Differences of opinions as to proper ends and means bulk so large that many reform movements have been irreparably split by them. The leaders of the National Council were
old hands at ideological controversy; it was as natural as breathing for them to
vigorously oppose any and all communist efforts to share in the FEPC movement.
To say that the two groups should have worked together better is to ignore basic
motivations beyond easy control; one can merely observe that the FEPC movement
suffered because of the conflict." P. 225, and see p. 165.
11. P. 228.
12. Since the experience with the President's Committee, more than a half-dozen
states have enacted FEPC legislation, ranging from laws with strong enforcement
powers, as in New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey, to those giv-

ing state officials authority merely to investigate charges of discrimination, as in
Indiana and Wisconsin. Minneapolis, Milwaukee, and Chicago now have FEPC
ordinances-and other cities are giving consideration to adoption of similar provisions.
The city of Philadelphia enacted an FEPC ordinance in 1948. P. 227.
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amendment and the FEPC campaign, 13 but even a superficial reader hastily
turning the pages of this work could hardly fail to be impressed with the
marked difference between the eighteenth amendment and FEPC legislation. The former outdistanced the community will, while the latter converts the basic American philosophy of equality of opportunity from preachment to practice. 14 A reform movement which was enthusiastically supported by Catholic, Jewish and Protestant faiths (and by all the major
divisions of Protestantism), by the Republican, Democratic, Progressive,
Socialist and Communist parties, by both candidates for the Presidency, by
the A. F. of L. 15 and the C. I. O.,16 by an impressive list of civic organizations," and by the "who's who" of enlightened big business 18 might
with some right claim that it was popularly accepted. The allegiance which
this reform attracted must be recognized as especially significant since
it gained increasing strength in the period of the post-war conservative
swing, and was developed with limited financial resources
19 and with only
20
partial access to the means of mass communication.
The study under review points up the dynamics of economic democracy. A few short years ago it was seriously charged that legislation prohibiting discrimination was being foisted upon America; that a handful
of selfish, clever zealots had duped well meaning individuals and organizations into supporting a legislative adventure which was actually not in
the public interest. Today, we would recognize as an obvious kind of
humor the suggestion that the Catholic hierarchy, the Society of Friends,
John Foster Dulles, 21 Dean Acheson,22 Herbert Bayard Swope, Henry
Luce, William Green, 23 Bishop Oxnam, 24 Nelson Rockefeller and Beards-

13. P. 128.
14. See Elson and Schanfield, Local Regulation of Discriminationin Employment
Practices,56 YALE L. J. 431 (1947), for a thorough consideration of the role of legislation in community education.
15. P. 148.
16. P. 225.
17. P. 115 et seq.
18. A telegram to congressional leaders urging the passage of a permanent FEPC
bill was signed by William L. Batt, President, S. K. F. Industries; Allen W. Dulles,
Sullivan & Cromwell; Paul G. Hoffman, President, Studebaker Corp.; Eric Johnston,
President, Motion Picture Association; Henry R. Luce, Time, Inc.; Dwight R. G.
Palmer, President, General Cable Corp.; Martin Quigley, President, Quigley Publishing Co.; Nelson A. Rockefeller; Anna M. Rosenberg; Beardsley Ruml, Chairman
of Board, R. H. Macy & Co.; Spyros P. Skouras, President, Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp.; Paul C. Smith, General Manager, San Francisco Chronicle; Herbert
Bayard Swope; Charles H. Tuttle, Breed, Abbott & Morgan; and Oren Root, Jr.
The passage of the Ives-Fulton bill was urged, in part, on the basis of "the successful
working of very similar laws in New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and other
states. . . . We like the reliance which the bill puts upon education and conciliation. On the other hand, we recognize the necessity of governmental sanctions when
conciliation breaks down."
19. P. 68 et seq.
20. P. 181 et seq.
21. Address at FEPC testimonial dinner in New York on March 6, 1948, in which
he urged passage of permanent FEPC legislation, declaring: "We should do that
[enact a permanent FEPC bill] because it is the right thing to do. Also we should
do it as a matter of national expedience because our position in the world will be
greatly improved if it is realized that we are seriously at work to erase what today
is the worst blot on our national escutcheon."
22. Letter to Fair Employment Practices Committee, dated May 18, 1944.
23. P. 148.
24. Pp. 134, 135.
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ley Ruml had been stampeded into joining hands in support of an unconstitutional, disaster-laden, "do-good" legislative program.
The time has come for all of us to join the swiftly moving present and
to recognize with Senator Ives that:
The record shows clearly that the people can act, if they will,
to promote the general welfare
and the continuing improvement of
25
the democratic way of life.
Julian E. Goldberg t

THE LAw OF THE SOVIET STATE. By Andrei Y. Vyshinsky. The
Macmillan Company, New York, 1948. Pp. xvii, 749. $15.00.
Whether as deputy foreign minister and United Nations representative, or as public prosecutor in the treason trials of the late thirties, or as
author of the standard treatise on Soviet constitutional law here translated
-Mr. Vyshinksy has delighted his followers and shocked his opponents
with his vigorous, uncompromising excoriation of everything "bourgeois"
and his equally forthright glorification of everything Soviet. His command of invective is extraordinary. In The Law of the Soviet State it
goes in two directions: first, against the law of other states, with their
"inhuman, bestial relationship to the exploited masses of the people," and
second, against the doctrines of earlier Soviet jurists, particularly against
"the rotten theory of the wrecker Pashukanis," with its "putrid vapor ...
whereby our enemies sought to sully the pure source of great and truly
scientific thought." On the other hand, no words are exalted enough to
do justice to the Soviet state and to its current doctrines. Under the leadership of "the genius Stalin," governed by the great Stalin Constitution,
"that genuine charter of the rights of emancipated humanity," the Soviet
Union has at last achieved what the best minds of mankind have yearned
for: justice, equality, freedom. "For the first time in history the people-the toiling national masses themselves-are the masters of their fate, themselves ruling their state with no exploiters, no landlords, no capitalists."
Whom does Vyshinsky hope to persuade? Apparently not the people
in countries outside the Soviet Union. Otherwise this book would have
been translated under Soviet auspices when it was written-in 1938instead of ten years later under the auspices of the Russian Translation
Project of the American Council of Learned Societies.
Moreover,
Vyshinsky is too shrewd to expect non-Soviet readers to stomach his distorted version of the society they live in-the allegation, for example, that
in the United States "by reason of the terror occurring at elections only
five per cent of the voters of the country vote freely ;" the implication that
despite certain formal concessions regarding working hours and conditions,
the lot of the worker in "bourgeois" countries is substantially no better
now then it was when Marx and Engels described the sweatshops of
nineteenth century England; and the like. It is of course possible that
25. Foreword to FEPC REFERENCE MANUAL, National Community Relations
Council (1948). Senator Ives was the co-author of the Quinn-Ives Bill of 1946, N. Y.
EXEc. LAW §§ 125-136, the first state FEPC law.
tLecturer, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Member of the Philadelphia
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Soviet readers, on the other hand, would believe that the law of other
states is sheer class-law, an instrument of capitalist exploitation. But
would Soviet readers believe the statement that "the Soviet state is a
complete stranger to methods of coercive socialization of the private-labor
economy"? Would they be impressed by the assertion that the right of
the various republics of the USSR freely to withdraw "expresses one of
the most important principles of the Lenin-Stalin national policy-the
voluntary character of the union . . ."? Would they be convinced by
the declaration that "only the Soviet court . . . is truly independent in
the authentic and direct sense of the word . . . of all influences and
inducements whatsoever in deciding specific court matters"? Would they
be persuaded that Soviet socialism has abolished all conflict between the
individual and the state-as Vyshinsky continually reiterates? Would it
not be as transparent to the Soviet reader as to the American that the
gap between legal principle and extra-legal reality, which Vyshinksy exploits to the full in dealing with "bourgeois" law, must also exist to some
extent, at least, in the Soviet social order-and that it is fallacious, therefore, to contrast existing injustices and inequalities in other countries
with laws proclaiming justice and equality in the Soviet Union?
It is more likely that Vyshinsky does not intend to convince anyone,
Soviet or non-Soviet, of the truth of his assertions. In this sense, the book
is not propaganda-though to the untutored American reader it will appear as sheer propaganda of the crudest kind. But if it is not propagandaand not, on the other hand, an earnest quest for truth for its own sakewhat is it?
There is a deeper purpose in The Law of the Soviet State which
Vyshinsky executes with the skill and subtlety worthy of his stature as a
lawyer. That purpose is to lay down a new party line-not as something
to be believed in by the masses, primarily, but as something to be accepted
and worked with by the leaders. The book is designed not for the masses,
particularly, but for professors, judges, officials, administrators-the new
Soviet intelligentsia. Its purpose is not to describe the structure and
functioning of the Soviet state (although hundreds of pages are devoted
to such description, in excruciating detail), but rather to establish the
method and the manner in which state and law are henceforth to be talked
about and studied in the Soviet Union. The method and manner are
relatively new, in 1938, and have not previously been authoritatively defined. It is Vyshinksy's purpose, therefore, authoritatively to declare the
new doctrine in terms adapted to the policy which that new doctrine is
designed to serve.
Policy and doctrine together come to this: (a) we are entering on a
new phase of the Revolution, in which the key word will be "stability ;"
(b) to achieve stability we must develop a legal system upon which we can
depend, and a sense of legality both among the leaders and in the masses;
(c) the earlier Marxist-Leninist doctrines that state and law are by their
very nature tools in the hands of an exploiting class, and that therefore
with the achievement of a classless society they will "wither away," must
be abandoned, or at least considerably modified; (d) a theory of state
and law must be developed which will be applicable to classless socialism
(the first stage of communism)-a theory which will put socialist law on
its own feet, give it a life of its own, apart from economics and politics
in the narrow sense of those words; (e) the new theory must look
Marxist-Leninist in order to support the fiction of continuity from 1917
on-a fiction which is related to the need for stability and also to the con-

1949]

BOOK REVIEWS

tinuation of Stalin in power despite the wholesale purge of Old Bolsheviks.
Vyshinksy is thus exploring new territory; he is pioneering. A good
deal of the invective and distortion is to cover his tracks against the
wolves who stand ready to fall upon and devour all who dare to deviate.
There must be no apparent deviation; everything must look like mere
exegesis on the holy writ of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. This is what makes
the book so distasteful to those who believe that human speech is more
than ritual. But this distaste should not obscure the fact that behind the
revision of the catechism lie very real issues.
These issues rarely appear in the text. Perhaps the closest The Law
of the Soviet State comes to an open statement of the fundamental problem it was designed to meet is in the following paragraph (p. 78):
"At present the science of Soviet socialist law lacks the necessary
congruity and unity. Hitherto, for example, the development of
public law, administrative law, and civil law among us has been
parallel and almost without correlation and congruity of any sort.
On the other hand, a series of problems (such as that of developing
contemporary kolkhozes [collective farms]) still await solution in
each of these branches of law-often obtaining no proper answer from
any one of them."
This is near the heart of the matter. Without "congruity and unity"
it is difficult both to construct a suitable framework for the regular and
orderly implementation of state policy and to inculcate a sense of law
and justice in the people as a whole. With each branch of law developing
independently to meet the exigencies of the moment, it is impossible to
establish basic principles which will serve as a guide for the legislative,
administrative, and judicial process as a whole.
In the context of this situation, the test of the merit of Vyshinsky's
work is whether or not it offers a foundation in theory for the elaboration
of a workable legal system. In terms of such a test as this, what from
some other viewpoint (e. g., that of telling what Soviet law is really like)
would appear to be a serious defect may actually be a real virtue. The
statement, for example, that "the Soviet state government was socialist
from the first days of the great October Socialist Revolution" (p. 365)
may confuse the historian who has learned that the Soviet codes promulgated under the N. E. P. (1921-1928) were concessions to the partial
restoration of capitalism and were in fact deliberately copied from
"bourgeois" codes; but Vyshinksy's re-statement of history now provides
Soviet jurists with a theoretical basis for utilizing and interpreting these
N. E. P. codes, which, with amendments, are still in force. Similarly, the
failure to devote more than a few innocuous pages to the position of the
Communist Party in the state, or to the role of planning, serves Vyshinsky's
purpose of establishing law as an independent pillar of the Soviet social
order, with its own requirements and its own qualities. This purpose is
not made explicit and is sometimes deliberately concealed, but it is implicit in the denunciation of previous leaders of Soviet law who had
denied the separate existence of law as such and had exalted Party and
Plan in opposition to Law. Now a foundation in theory is provided for
subsequent court decisions requiring contracts between state business enterprises to be fulfilled in certain types of cases even where the terms of
the contracts were in violation of authorized plans; and now a theoretical
basis is laid for the subsequent exclusion from court proceedings of docu-
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ments submitted by public organizations (such as Communist Party
organs) which have no direct connection with the case at hand. These
practical implications of Vyshinsky's argument are nowhere mentioned in
the book. They are to be read where Soviet eyes are trained to readbetween the lines.
Yet the establishment of the doctrine that law under socialism is both
possible and necessary, that Soviet law is and always has been socialist,
and that socialist law (by definition) expresses the will of the whole
Soviet people, hardly seems enough on which to found a workable legal
system. Nor does the other half of Vysiinksy's demonstration-the detailed description of the bare mechanics of Soviet state and law, with
scarcely any analysis of the real processes of their operation.
Very likely Vyshinsky could have gone further had he so desired.
He apparently considered it his main job to refute, in Marxist terms, the
nihilistic theory of law which had previously dominated. The first step
was to say, as Vyshinsky does with utter frankness, that alongside "suppression and the use of force," which "are still essential during the transition period," it is necessary to have "also" due process of law. Subsequent
writings of Vyshinsky and of others have gone further in spelling out the
new accent on law and legality. In the long run, however, there are serious
difficulties. Marxism, with all its flexibility, is more easily adapted to
the development of a system of force than to the development of a system
of law. That is the paradox, and the dilemma, which lies at the basis of a
book that requires not merely translation but careful and extensive annotation throughout.
Harold J. Berman t
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